Data as of Nov 12, 2026

5.76.167.0/24

52 residential-proxy exits · 30 days

JSC Kazakhtelecom

Announcement
RPKI valid
Announced by
Type
Residential
Risk
0 / 100 · Low

Residential-proxy exits

Proxy exits
52
20% of its addresses · 30 days
Providers
82
selling exits here
Oct 13, 2026 – Nov 11, 2026

Exits seen per day

4.2K observations

Proxy providers listing exits

  • 711Proxy
  • 911Proxy
  • ASHBURNPROXIES
  • Ake.net
  • AnyIP
  • B2Proxy
  • BartProxies
  • BestProxy
  • BirdProxies
  • BlurPath
  • BottingTools
  • BuyingProxy
  • ByteProxies
  • Byteful
  • CatProxies
  • CliProxy
  • DataImpulse
  • Datarama
  • Decodo
  • EZProxies
  • EnigmaProxy
  • Evomi
  • FLEETPROXY
  • FastProxy
  • FlashProxy
  • GSocks
  • Geonix
  • Geonode
  • GhostConnect
  • GloryCloud
  • GoProxies
  • GonzoProxy
  • HideProxy
  • IPFly
  • IPPeak
  • IPRoyal
  • Infatica
  • InfiniteProxies
  • KindProxy
  • Kookey
  • LemonBright
  • LemonLabs
  • LemonPrime
  • LudaxProxy
  • MangoProxy
  • MoMoProxy
  • NSocks
  • NextProxy
  • NiuProxy
  • NodeProxy
  • NovProxy
  • NovaProxy
  • Novada
  • Oxylabs
  • PROXYON
  • PROXYSCRAPE
  • PROXYWING_BASIC
  • ProxiesVision
  • Proxio
  • Proxiware
  • Proxy-Seller
  • Proxy4U
  • ProxyEmpire
  • ProxyGeo
  • ProxyHat
  • ProxyRack
  • ProxyWing
  • Proxyma
  • PuraRoute
  • RainProxy
  • RapidProxy
  • SPYDERPROXY_BASIC
  • SPYDERPROXY_PREMIUM
  • Shifter
  • Smartproxy
  • Thordata
  • VantageProxies
  • VitalExclusive
  • Webshare
  • YumiProxy
  • ZENPROXY_LITE
  • ZENPROXY_PREMIUM

Announcements

Less specific

Covering announcements

PrefixOriginTypeProxy exitsHolderRPKI
5.76.0.0/16
since Jun 2012
AS9198Residential17,263
145 always on
JSC Kazakhtelecom

Registrations in this block

The registry's network records over this block, widest first, each under its parent.

RangeAddressesNetnameHolderTypeCreatedAbuse contact
5.76.0.0/1665,536KZ-KAZAKTELECOM-20120612JSC Kazakhtelecom (ORG-KDNA1-RIPE) · KZALLOCATED PAJun 12, 2012abuse@telecom.kz
└ 5.76.160.0/212,048GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KTJSC KazakhtelecomASSIGNED PAApr 11, 2013abuse@telecom.kz
via KZ-KAZAKTELECOM-20120612

A contact marked “via” is the registry's: the record names none of its own, so the registry hands down its parent's.

Network & registry

RPKI

Route origin authorizations

ROA prefixASNMax lenAnchorVerdict
5.76.160.0/21AS9198/21RIPERPKI valid
5.76.0.0/16AS9198/24RIPERPKI valid
IRR

Route objects on 5.76.160.0/21

OriginRegistryDescriptionMaintainerModified
AS9198 RIPEKazakhtelecom Data Network AdministrationKNIC-MNTApr 11, 2013